In this paper, we give quantum algorithms for two fundamental computation problems: solving polynomial systems over finite fields and optimization where the arguments of the objective function and constraints take values from a finite field or a bounded interval of integers. The quantum algorithms can solve these problems with any given success probability and have polynomial runtime complexities in the size of the input, the degree of the inequality constraints, and the condition number of certain matrices derived from the problem. So, we achieved exponential speedup for these problems when their condition numbers are small. As applications, quantum algorithms are given to three basic computational problems in cryptography: the polynomial system with noise problem, the short integer solution problem, the shortest vector problem, as well as the cryptanalysis for the lattice based NTRU cryptosystem. It is shown that these problems and NTRU can against quantum computer attacks only if their condition numbers are large, so the condition number could be used as a new criterion for the lattice based post-quantum cryptosystems.
Introduction
Solving polynomial systems and optimization over finite fields are fundamental computation problems in mathematics and computer science, which are also typical NP hard problems. In this paper, we give quantum algorithms to these problems, which could be exponential faster than the traditional methods under certain conditions.
Main results
Let F q be a finite field, where q = p m for a prime number p and m ∈ N ≥1 . Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ F q [X] be a set of polynomials in variables X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and with total sparseness T F = r i=1 #f i , where #f denotes the number of terms in f . For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we show that Theorem 1.1. There is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has a solution in F n q and computes one if F = 0 does have solutions in F n q , with success probability at least 1 − ǫ and complexity O(T 3.5 F D 3.5 m 5.5 log 4.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ), where D = n+ n i=1 ⌊log 2 max j deg x i f j ⌋, T F is the total sparseness of F, and κ is the condition number of F (see Theorem 3.13 for definition).
The complexity of a quantum algorithm is the number of quantum gates needed to solve the problem. Since T F , D, log p m are smaller than the input size, the complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the input size and the condition number, which means that we can solve polynomial systems over finite fields using quantum computers with any given success probability and in polynomial-time if the condition number κ of F is small, say when κ is poly(n, D).
We also give a quantum algorithm to solve the following optimization problem. Note that for q = p, Problem (1) includes polynomial system solving over F q as a special case. Problem (1) is meaningless for F q with q = p m and m > 1, since F q cannot be embedded into Z.
We apply our methods to three computational problems widely used in cryptography: the polynomial systems with noise problem (PSWN) [2, 17, 20] , the short integer solution problem (SIS) [1] , the shortest vector problem (SVP) [4, 23, 6] . We also show how to recover the private keys for the latticed based cryptosystem NTRU with our algorithm. The complexity for solving all of these problems is polynomial in the input size and their condition numbers.
The latticed based computational problems SVP and LWE are the bases for 23 of the 69 submissions for the call by NIST to standardize the post-quantum public-key encryption systems [4] . LWE is another important problem in cryptography and can be reduced to the SIS problem [25] . In theory, our results imply that the 23 proposed cryptosystems can against the attack of quantum computers only if the related condition numbers are large. So, the condition number could be used as a new criterion for lattice based post-quantum cryptosystems.
Let p be a prime and F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ F p [X] with r ≫ n. The PSWN is to find an X ∈ F n p which satisfies the maximal number of equations in F. The problem is also called MAX-POSSO [2, 20] . Our quantum algorithm for PSWN has complexity O(n 3.5 T 3.5 F log 8 pκ 2 ), where κ is the condition number of the problem. The PSWN is very hard in the sense that, even for the linear system with noise (LSWN) over F p , to find an X satisfying more than 1/p of the equations is NP hard [17, 30] .
Lattice-based cryptography began in 1996 with a seminal work by Ajtai [1] , who presented a family of one-way functions based on the SIS. The SIS problem is to find a solution of a homogenous linear system AX = 0 mod p for A ∈ F r×n p , such that || X|| 2 is smaller than a given bound. Our quantum algorithm for SIS has complexity O((n log p + r) 2.5 (T A log p + n log 2 p)κ 2 ), where T A is the number of nonzero elements in A and κ is the condition number of the problem.
The SVP and CVP are two basic NP-hard problems widely used in cryptography. The SVP is to find a nonzero vector with the smallest Euclidean norm in a lattice in R m . The CVP is to find a vector in a lattice, which is closest to a given vector. The SIS [1] and LWE [25] are the randomized versions of SVP and CVP, respcetively. Our quantum algorithm for SVP has complexity O(m(n 7.5 + m 2.5 )(n 3 + log h) log 4.5 hκ 2 ), where n is the rank of the lattice, h is the maximal value in the generators of the lattice, and κ is the condition number of the problem. Our quantum algorithm for CVP has a similar complexity.
NTRU is a lattice-based public key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [19] , which is one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptosystems. Our quantum algorithm can be used to recover the private key from the public key in time O(N 4.5 log 4.5 qκ 2 ) for an NTRU with parameters (N, p, q) with q > p. In particular, we show that the three versions of NTRU recommended in [19] have the desired security against quantum computers only if their condition numbers are large.
Main idea of the algorithm
Let F ⊂ C[X] be a set of polynomials over C. A solution of F is called Boolean if its components are either 0 or 1. Similarly, a variable x is called a Boolean variable if it satisfies x 2 − x = 0. In [12] , we give a quantum algorithm 1 to find Boolean solutions of a polynomial system over C, which is called B-POSSO in the rest of this paper. The main idea of the quantum algorithms proposed in this paper is to reduce the problem to be solved to B-POSSO, under the condition that the number of variables and the total sparseness of the new polynomial system is polynomial in the size of the original polynomial system.
Our algorithm for problem (1) consists of three main steps: (1) The equational constraints f j (X) = 0 mod p, j = 1, . . . , r are reduced into polynomial equations in Boolean variables over C. (2) The inequality constraints 0 ≤ g i (X, Y) ≤ b i , i = 1, . . . , s are reduced into polynomial equations in Boolean variables over C. (3) The problem of finding the minimal value of the objective function is reduced several B-POSSOs. We will give a brief introduction to each of these three steps below.
A key method used in our algorithm is to use a polynomial in Boolean variables to represent the integers 0, 1 . . . , b for b ∈ Z >1 . Let θ b (G bit ) = ⌊log 2 b⌋−1 k=0 For F ⊂ F p [X] and F p = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, we use three steps to reduce the problem of finding a solution of F in F p to a B-POSSO. (1) F is reduced to a quadratic polynomial system (MQ) F 1 by introducing new variables. (2) Each variable in F 1 is expanded as x i = θ p−1 (X i ) and F 1 is reduced to another MQ F 2 in Boolean variables X i = {X ij , j = 0, . . . , ⌊log 2 (p − 1)⌋}. Since F 1 is quadratic, the total sparseness of F 2 is well controlled. (3) We obtain a polynomial over C from F 2 as follows
where U g is a set of Boolean variables. It is shown that solutions of F in F p can be recovered from Boolean solutions of F 3 , which can be found with the quantum algorithm from [12] .
We also reduce an inequality constraint 0 ≤ g(X, Y) ≤ b for g ∈ Z[X, Y] and b ∈ Z >0 into a B-POSSO. There exist X and Y such that 0 ≤ g(X, Y) ≤ b if and only if g(Y, Y) − θ b (G g ) = 0 has a solution for X, Y, and G g , where G g is a set of Boolean variables. We reduce g(Y, Y) into a polynomial in Boolean variables by first reducing g(Y, Y) into an MQ and then expanding the variables into Boolean variables by using the θ function. Let d be the degree of g i . Then the values of g i is exponential in d and hence the number of Boolean variables needed is polynomial in d. This is why the complexity of the algorithm depends on d.
Since all variables are bounded, the objective function o is also bounded, and we can assume o ∈ [0, u) for some u ∈ N. We design a novel search scheme to reduce the minimization of o(Y, Y) ∈ [0, u) to several B-POSSOs. The minimal value of o is found by bisecting the feasible interval [0, u) recursively into subintervals of the form [α, 2 β ) and deciding whether o ∈ [α, 2 β ) has a solution, which is equivalent to solving the equation o − (α + β−1 j=0 H j 2 j ) = 0 for Boolean variables H j . As a consequence, we can find the minimal value of o by solving several B-POSSOs.
Relation with existing work
Problem (1) includes many important problems as special cases, such as the polynomial system solving over finite fields [14] , PSWN [2, 17, 20, 30] , SIS [1] , SVP/CVP [4, 23, 6] , the (0, 1)-programming problem [16] , the quadratic unconstrained binary optimization problem which is the mathematical problem that can be solved by the D-Wave System [21] , which are all important computation problems and were widely studied.
Comparing to the existing work, our algorithm has two major advantages. First, we give a universal approach to a very general problem. Second, the complexity of our algorithm is polynomial in the inputs size, the degree of the inequalities, and the condition number of the problem. Since the problems under consideration are NP hard, existing algorithms are exponential in some of the parameters such as the number of variables. In this aspect, we give a new way of looking at these NP hard problems by reducing the computational difficulty to the size of the condition number.
Our algorithm is based on the quantum algorithm to solve B-POSSOs proposed in [12] , which in turn is based on the HHL quantum algorithm and its variants to solve linear systems [18, 5, 13] . Comparing to the HHL algorithm, we can give the exact solution, while the HHL algorithm can only give the quantum state. The speedup of our algorithms comes from the HHL algorithm. The limitation on the condition number is inherited from the HHL algorithm, and it is proved in [18] that the dependence on condition number cannot be substantially improved. Also note that, the best classic numerical method for solving an order N linear equation
which also depends on the condition number κ of A [26] .
The method of treating the inequality constraints with the function θ b (G bit ) simplifies the computational significantly. The binary representation η b = ⌊log 2 (b)⌋ i=0 B i 2 i for b is often used in the literature to represent the integers 0, 1, . . . , b. The values of η b is 0, 1, . . . , 2 ⌊log 2 (b)⌋+1 − 1, which may contain integers strictly larger than b and cannot be used to represent inequalities. In [7, 3] , the inequality 0 ≤ g ≤ b is reduced to b i=0 (g − i) = 0. Our reduction θ b (G bit ) is better, which does not increase the degree of the equation and the size of the equation is increased in the logarithm scale, while the method used in [7, 3] increases the degree by a factor b and increases the size of the equation exponentially.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the θ b (G bit ) function and give an explicit formula to reduce a polynomial system into an MQ. In Section 3, we present the algorithm for solving polynomial systems over finite fields. In Section 4, we show how to reduce the inequality constraints in problem (1) to a B-POSSO. In Section 5, we present the algorithm for solving problem (1) . In Section 6, we present a quantum algorithm for PSWN. In Section 7, we present a quantum algorithm for SIS. In Section 8, we present a quantum algorithm for SVP/CVP. In Section 9, we present a quantum algorithm to recover the private key for NTRU. In Section 10, conclusions are given.
Two basic reductions
In this section, we give two basic reductions frequently used in the paper: to represent an integer interval with a Boolean polynomial and to reduce a polynomial system to an MQ.
Represent an integer interval with a Boolean polynomial
A variable X is called a Boolean variable if it satisfies X 2 − X = 0. In this paper, we use uppercase symbols to represent Bollean variables. A polynomial is called a Boolean polynomial if it is in a set of Boolean variables. In this section, we will construct a Boolean polynomial whose values are exactly the integers 0, 1, . . . , b for a given positive integer b > 0. 
Proof. We first assume that θ b (B bit ) is evaluated over C. It is easy to check this lemma when b = 1. When b > 1, from the definition of s, we have b/2 < 2 s ≤ b and hence 2 s − 1 < b.
Since the values of For instance, 
Reduce polynomial system to MQ
It is well known that a polynomial system can be reduced to an MQ by introducing some new indeterminates. In this section, we give an explicit reduction which is needed in the complexity analysis in this paper.
For any field F , let F [X] be the polynomial ring over F in the indeterminates X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Denote the sparseness (number of terms) of f ∈ F [X] as #f . For F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ F [X], denote T F = r i=1 #f i to be the total sparseness of F, N F = #X = n to be the number of indeterminates in F, d i = max j deg x i (f j ) to be the degree of F in x i , M (F) to be the set of all monomials in F, and C(F) to be the size of the coefficients of the polynomials in F, (F) F [X] to be the ideal generated by F in F [X].
We want to introduce some new indeterminates to rewrite F as an MQ.
. We can introduce a set of new indeterminates V and an
Proof. If F is already an MQ, set Q(F) = F and V = ∅. First, we introduce new indeterminates
i be a monomial of F, and
To rewrite this product as an MQ, we introduce new indeterminates {v 1 , . . . , v Lα−2 } and quadratic polynomials
where V = {u i , v k } and f i is obtained by replacing X α by v Lα−2 u Lα in f i . For convenience, we denote
Let V = {u i , v k } be the set of new indetermiantes. It is clear that the number of these u ij is
Since we only introduce new coefficients ±1, we have C(Q(F)) = C(F). 
Remark 2.5. As mentioned in Example 2.4, the representation for Q(F) is not optimal. The binary decision diagram (BDD) [11] can be used to give a better representation for Q(F) by using less variables v i .
3 Polynomial system solving over finite fields
be a finite set of polynomials over the finite field F q , t i = #f i , and
In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to find a solution of F in F n q . Denote the solutions of F in F n q by V Fq (F). For a prime number p, we use the standard representation
In this section, we will construct a set of Boolean polynomials over C, from which we can obtain V Fp (F). The reduction procedure consists of the following two steps.
Step 1. We reduce F to a set of polynomials in Boolean variables over F p . If p = 2, then the x i are already Boolean and we can skip this step. We thus assume p > 2 and set
where θ p−1 is defined in (2) and X ij are Boolean variables. Let
For any set S, set
We have Lemma 3.1. There is a surjective morphism
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, it is easy to check that Π 1 is surjective. By Lemma 2.1, #θ p−1 (X i ) = ⌊log 2 (p − 1)⌋ + 1 and hence #X bit = O(n log p). Since F is an MQ, for any monomial X α ij of f i , we have |α ij | ≤ 2 and (6) has at most O(log 2 p) terms. Therefore, the total sparseness of f ibit is O(#f i log 2 p) and the total sparseness of B(F) is O(T F log 2 p).
Step 2. We introduce new Boolean indeterminates U i,j and reduce each f ibit into a Boolean polynomial over Z. Let t ′ i = #f ibit and let
and we have
There is a surjective morphism
where the last equivalence comes from (6), and
We now prove that Π 2 is surjective. By Lemma 3.1,
Then, the map Π 2 is surjective.
Since the map in (5) is not injective, this map Π 2 is also not injective. Lemma 3.3. The polynomial system P (F) defined in (9) is of total sparseness T P (F ) = O(T F log 2 p) and has N P (F ) = O(n log p + r i=1 log t i + r log log p) indeterminates. Furthermore, we can compute
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, B(F) is of total sparseness O(T F log 2 p) and has O(n log p) indeterminates. Since F is an MQ, by the proof of Lemma 3.1, we have t ′ i = #f i,bit ≤ t i log 2 p. Then, the number of
log t i + r log log p). Therefore, the total number of indeterminates is #X bit + #U bit = O(n log p + r i=1 log t i + r log log p).
From (9), the total sparseness of
To compute each 2 j mod p costs O(log p) binary operations. Using the fast polynomial arithmetics [28] , to expand all the polynomials in B(F) costs O(T F log 2 p) binary operations. The cost of other steps to obtain P (F) is negligible.
Remark 3.5. In (8), we can use θ ⌊C i /p⌋ instead of θ t ′ i to introduce less indeterminates. To compute
, and to compute all C i costs O(T F log 3 p), which is
. But, this is negligible comparing to the final complexity of the algorithm in Corollary 3.9.
Solving polynomial systems over F
To solve P (Q(F)), we need the following result, where a quantum algorithm for B-POSSO is given. Here is the main result of this section.
and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a quantum algorithm to find a solution of F in F p with probability at least 1 − ǫ and the complexity of the algorithm is O(T 3.5 F D 3.5 log 4.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ), where
and κ is the condition number of P (Q(F)), also called the condition number of F.
We first estimate the total sparseness of P (Q(F)).
, we obtain the bounds involving n and d.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We can find a solution of F as follows. Construct 
. By Lemma 2.3, Lemma 3.2, and Theorem 3.6, X is a solution of F in F p with probability at least 1 − ǫ.
We now give the complexity. By Lemma 3.8, P (Q(F)) is of sparseness O(T F D log 2 p) and has O(T F D log p) indeterminates. By Theorem 3.6, we can find a Boolean solution of
The complexity for other steps can be neglected.
Since the solutions are in F p , we can assume d < p. By Theorem 3.7, we have Corollary 3.9. The complexity to find a solution for
2 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ). In the last step, we here use the reduction (a + b log c)(
Corollary 3.11. If p = 2, then the complexity to find a solution of F = 0 mod 2 is O((n+r) 2.5 (n+ T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. If p = 2, then we do not need to convert G to MQ and
Similar to the proof of Corollary 3.10, the complexity is
Polynomial equation solving over F q
In this section, we consider polynomial equation solving in a general finite field F q by reducing the problem to equation solving over F p .
If q = p m with p a prime number and m ∈ Z >1 , then F q = F p (θ), where ϕ(θ) = 0 for a monic irreducible polynomial ϕ with deg
Lemma 3.12. There is an isomorphism
is an MQ with total sparseness ≤ m 3 T F , #G(F) = mr, and #X θ = mn.
Proof. It is easy to show that #G(F) = m#F, #X θ = m#X and G(F) is also an MQ. Then the total sparseness of G(F) will be concerned. F has T F terms, where each term is of degree ≤ 2. For
We have Theorem 3.13. There is a quantum algorithm to find a solution of F ⊂ F q [X] with probability at least 1 − ǫ and in time O(m 5.5 T 3.5 F D 3.5 log 4.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ), where T F is the total sparseness of F,
and κ is the condition number of P (G(Q(F))).
Proof. Using Lemma 3.12, we can solve F over F q similar to the method given in the proof of Theorem 3.7. In stead of solving (10) and X θbit is the bit representation for X θ .
We now prove the complexity. By Lemma 2.3,
Corollary 3.14. If F is an MQ, the complexity is O(m 5.5 (n log p + r) 2.5 (n + T F ) log 2 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
is an MQ, then the complexity is O((n + r) 2.5 (n + T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Reduce inequalities to MQ in Boolean variables
In this section, we show how to reduce the inequality constraints
Reduce polynomial system over C to MQ in Boolean variables over
. We will reduce G into an equivalent MQ in Boolean variables over C under the condition (3), where V is the set of new indeterminates introduced in Lemma 2.3. We will reduce X, Y, and V = {v 1 , . . . , v l } to Boolean variables. For X, we use (5) to rewrite them as Boolean variables X bit . For Y, using Lemma 2.1, the integers y i satisfying 0 ≤ y i ≤ u i can be represented exactly as follows
where Y i,j are Boolean variables.
where
, and y i in (11) , and v i in (12) into Q(G),ĝ k , and Q(G), we obtain
The following result shows that G and B(G) are equivalent.
Lemma 4.1. ForX ∈ F n p andY ∈ Z n such that 0 ≤y j ≤ u j for each j, there exists aV bit such that g k (X,Y) = g k (X bit ,Y bit ,V bit ) for k = 1, . . . , s and B(G)(X bit ,Y bit ,V bit ) = 0.
Proof. From (3), it is easy to see that starting fromX ∈ F n p andY ∈ Z m , one may obtain a uniqueV such that B(g k )(X,Y,V) = 0 and g k (X,Y) =ĝ k (X,Y,V) for each k. It suffices to show thatX,Y,V can be written as their Boolean forms, which is valid forX,Y due to (5) and (11) and Lemma 2.1. From Lemma 2.3, each v i ∈ V is a monomial in X and
, and C(Q(G)) = C(G). Note that |X| = n, |Y| = m, and |V| is bounded by
By (12) and Lemma 2.1,
). By (14) and Lemma 2.1,
Note that monomials of Q(G) are of the form x i x j , x i y j , x i v j , y i y j , y i v j , or v i v j when we rewrite them as Boolean variables, the sparseness of the new expressions are bounded by log 2 p, log p log h,
From (12) and the fact that B(G) is MQ, the bit size of the coefficients of
Reduce inequalities into MQ in Boolean variables
We now consider the inequality constraints of problem (1):
. . , u m ∈ N. We will reduce I into an MQ in Boolean variables. Let
where G i,k are Boolean variables, g i and B(G) are defined in (13) . We summarize the result of this section as the following result. We now estimate the parameters of I(I).
. . , g s } and T G ≥ s the total sparseness of G. Then, we have 
Bounded integer solutions of polynomial inequalities and equations
As a direct application of the reduction method given in this section, we can give a quantum algorithm to find a feasible solution to the inequality constraint
). Since N I(I) < T I(I) , by Theorem 3.6, the complexity to find a Boolean solution of
A closely related problem is to find bounded integer solutions of a polynomial system over Z. Proof. By Lemma 4.1, to find an integer solution to G = 0, we need just to find a Boolean solution of B(G) defined in (13) . By Lemma 4.2, we have
, by Theorem 3.6, the complexity to find a Boolean
For a general polynomial system in C[X], the bound for coordinates of solutions could be doubleexponential, as shown by the following example.
On the other hand, the isolated solutions of a polynomial system is at most double-exponential [29, p. 341] . In a similar way, it is also possible to find bounded rational solutions of a polynomial system.
Optimization over finite fields

A quantum algorithm for the optimization problem
In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to solve the optimization problem (1). The idea is to search the minimal value of the objective function by solving several B-POSSOs, which will be done in four steps.
Step 1. By Lemmas 2.3 and 3.2, we reduce the equational constraints f j (X) = 0 mod p, j = 1, . . . , r to an MQ in Boolean variables over C:
Step 2. By Lemma 4.4, we reduce the inequality constraints I = {0 ≤ g i (X, Y) ≤ b i , i = 1, . . . , s} to an MQ in Boolean variables over C:
Step 3. Applying Lemma 4.1 to the objective function o(X, Y), we may reduce o into a quadratic polynomial in Boolean variables o ∈ C[X bit , Y bit , V 3bit ] and an MQ G 2 = B({o}) ⊂ Z[X bit , Y bit , V 3bit ] defined in (13) . For the simplicity of presentation, we denote where
and C is defined in (15).
Step 4. The basic idea to search a minimal value of the objective function is as follows. Since all the variables are bounded, the objective function is also bounded, so we may assume α ≤ o(Ž bit ) < µ for some α, µ ∈ N. We divide [α, µ) into two roughly equal parts: [α, α + 2 β ) and [α + 2 β , µ) and solve the following decision problem
where If the answer to problem (17) is yes, we repeat the procedure for the new feasible interval [α, o(Ž bit )). If the answer is no, we repeat the procedure for the new feasible interval [α + 2 β , µ). The procedure ends when µ = α + 1.
We now give the algorithm to solve problem (1). For convenience of later usage, we add a new constraint 0 ≤ o < u for a given u ∈ N> 0.
Algorithm 5.3 (QFpOpt).
Input: Problem (1), ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and a u ∈ Z >0 such that 0 ≤ o < u.
is the minimal value of o, or "fail".
Step 1: Set α = 0, µ = u.
Step 2: Compute C in (15).
Step 3:
Step 4: LetŽ bit = QBoolSol(L αβ , ǫ/ log 4/3 u), where QBoolSol is from Theorem 3.6.
Step 5: If Algorithm QBoolSol returns a solution:
Step 5.1: ComputeX andY fromX bit andY bit according to (5) and (11), respectively.
Step 5.2: IfF bit = 0, return α,X andY.
Step 5.3: IfF bit = 0, let µ = o(Ž bit ) and goto Step 3.
Step 6: IfŽ bit = ∅, then
Step 6.1: If µ − α > 1, let α = α + 2 β , and goto Step 3.
Step 6.2: If µ − α = 1 and µ = u, return µ,X andY.
Step 6.3: If µ − α = 1 and µ = u, return "fail". 
and κ is the maximal condition number of all L αβ in the algorithm, called the condition number of the problem.
Proof. We first prove the termination of the algorithm by showing that the feasible interval [α, µ) will decrease strictly after each loop starting from Step 3. In Step 3, we split [α,
Step 5.3, we start a new loop for [α, µ 1 ), where
Then after this step, the feasible interval will decrease by at least 1 2 (µ − α) due to 2 β ≤ (µ − α)/2. In Step 6.1, we start a new loop for [α + 2 β , µ). After this step, the feasible interval will decrease by more than 1 4 (µ − α) due to (µ − α)/4 < 2 β . In summary, after each loop, the algorithm either terminates or has a smaller feasible interval which is of at most 3/4 of the size of the feasible interval of the previous loop. So, the algorithm will terminate after at most log 4/3 u loops.
We now prove the correctness of the algorithm, which follows from the following claim:
The minimal value of o is in [α, µ] during the algorithm (20) if the minimal value exists and Algorithm QBoolSol in Step 4 always returns a solution of L αβ if such a solution exists. The above claim is obviously true for the initial values given in Step 1.
In
Step 5, by Lemma 5.2, we find a solutionŽ bit such that o(Ž bit ) ∈ [α, α + 2 β ). In Step 5.2, the conditionF bit = 0 means that o(Ž bit ) = α and the minimal solution o is found by claim (20) . In Step 5.3, the conditionF bit = 0 means that o(Ž bit ) = α and we have a new µ 1 = o(Ž bit ). Since o ∈ [α, µ 1 ] has a solutionŽ bit , by claim (20) , the minimal value of o is in [α, µ 1 ], and the claim is proved in this case.
Step 6, QBoolSol returns ∅, meaning that o(Ž bit ) ∈ [α, α + 2 β ) has no solution and the minimal value of o must be in [α + 2 β , µ) if it exists. So, in Step 6.1, we will find the minimal value of o in [α + 2 β , µ) in the next loop, and claim (20) is proved in this case. In Step 6.2, we have µ − α = 1 and µ = u. Since o ∈ [α, α + 2 β ) has no solution, by claim (20) , µ = α + 1 must be the minimal value of o. Note that in Step 6, we only update the lower bound α. In Step 5, we only update the upper bound µ, and when µ is updated we have µ = o(Ž bit ) = o(X,Y). Therefore, µ = o(X,Y) is always valid, once Step 5 is executed. The condition µ = b implies that Step 5 has been executed at least one time and hence µ = o(X,Y). In Step 6.3, the conditions µ − α = 1 and µ = u means that Step 5 is never executed and the problem has no solution.
Finally, the solution obtained by Algorithm 5.3 is correct if and only if each
Step 4 is correct, that is, if L αβ does have solutions, then QBoolSol will return a solution. Since Step 4 will execute at most log 4/3 u times, by Theorem 3.6, the probability for the algorithm to be correct is at least (1 − ǫ/ log 4/3 u) log 4/3 u > 1 − ǫ.
We now analyse the complexity. Note that 2 is added to d f to make sure log d f = 0. By Lemma 3.8, F 1 is of total sparseness O(nT F log d f log 2 p) and has O(nT F log d f log p) indeterminates.
By Lemma 4.5,
T L αβ κ 2 log(ǫ/ log u)). It is clear that in each loop, the complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Step 4. Since we have at most log 4/3 u loops, the complexity for Algorithm 5.
We now show how to solve the original problem (1). 
Applications to linear (0, 1)-programming and QUBO
In this section, we use two (0, 1)-programming problems to illustrate Algorithm 5.3. QUBO means quadratic unconstrained binary optimization, which is the mathematical problem that can be solved by the D-Wave
The linear (0, 1)-programming is one of Karp's 21 NP-complete problems [22] which covers lots of fundamental computational problems, such as the subset sum problem, the assignment problem, the traveling salesperson problem, the knapsack problem, etc. For more information about this problem, please refer to [16] . The linear (0, 1)-programming can be stated as follows [8] min
where Y bit = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) and a ij , c j , h i ∈ Z for any i, j. We reduce problem (21) to the standard form (1) .
So we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (22) . Let G = {g 1 , . . . , g s }. Since g i are linear, we do not need to compute Q(g i ) and V bit = ∅ (see (12) for definition) and B(G) = ∅ (see (13) for definition). Since y j are Boolean variables, we do not need to use (11) to expand them and hence
where G bit = {G ikl } are Boolean variables and
where F bit = {F 1 , . . . , F β−1 } are Boolean variables.
Proposition 5.7. We can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (22) with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and in time O(s(m 2.5 + s 2.5 log 2.5 h)(m + log h)κ 2 log(1/ǫ) log u) where u = 2 Proof. Since #Y bit = m, #G bit = s log b, and #F bit = log u, L αβ has m + s log b + log u Boolean variables and total sparseness s(m + log b) + m + 1 + log u. Since u, b ≤ h, L αβ has N L αβ = O(m + s log h) Boolean variables and total sparseness T L αβ = O(s(m + log h)). By Theorem 3.6, the complexity is O((m + s log h) 2.5 (s(m + log h))κ 2 log(1/ǫ) log u = O(s(m 2.5 + s 2.5 log 2.5 h)(m + log h)κ 2 log(1/ǫ) log u).
In the rest of this section, we consider the QUBO problem. The QUBO problem is to find an Y bit = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) T ∈ {0, 1} m that minimizes Y T bit QY bit for an upper-triangular matrix Q = (Q i,j ) with Q i,j ∈ Z, which can be written as the following (0, 1)-programming problem:
In order to solve this problem, we need to give the lower and upper bounds for the objective function.
Problem (24) can be converted into the standard form with the new objective function o Q = o Q + m 2 Q max and u = 2m 2 Q max + 1. Then, we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (24) . Let
where 
Polynomial system with noise
In this section, we consider the polynomial systems with noise problem (PSWN), which is an optimization problem over finite fields and has important applications in cryptography [2, 20] .
Definition 6.1. Let p be a prime. Given a polynomial system F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ F p [X], the PSWN is to find an X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) τ ∈ F n p such that F = e for the "smallest" error-vector e = (e 1 , . . . , e r ) τ ∈ F r p .
In most cases, the Hamming weight e H of e is used to measure the "smallness" and it is assumed that r ≫ n, that is, we minimize the number of non-zero components of e or satisfy the maximal number of equations of F = 0. Therefore, PSWN is also called MAX-POSSO. We first give the following representation for e H . Lemma 6.2. Let e = (e 1 , . . . , e r ) τ ∈ F n p and H j = e p−1 j in F p . Then H j is Boolean and e H = m j=1 H j when the summation is over C.
Proof. e j ∈ F p implies H j = e p−1 j is either 0 or 1 in F p , and H j = 1 if and only if e j = 0. Then, H j is a Boolean variable. Thus, we have m j=1 H j = e H when the summation is over C.
where H bit = {H 1 , . . . , H r } are Boolean variables and E = {e 1 , . . . , e r } are variables over F p . By Lemma 6.2, PSWN can be formulated as the following optimization problem over finite fields:
which can be solved by Algorithm 5.3.
Due to the special structure of E(F), we can achieve better complexities than that given in Theorem 5.4. Following (19) , the equation set L αβ for PSWN is
where F bit = {F 1 , . . . , F β−1 } are Boolean variables. We have Proposition 6.3. There is a quantum algorithm to solve PSWN in time O(n 3.5 T 3.5 F log 8 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ) and with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, where T F is the total sparseness of F, and κ is the extended condition number of F.
Proof. We first give the complexity of Step 4 of Algorithm 5.3, that is, the complexity to solve
r }, and
, where #V = O(r log p), #Q(F 2 ) = O(r log p), and T Q(F 2 ) = O(r log p) by the proof for Lemma 2.3. By Lemma 3.3,
and N L αβ = O(T F D log p + r log 2 p + log r) = O(T F n log 2 p). By Theorem 3.6, the complexity to solve L αβ is O((T F n log 2 p) 2.5 (T F n log 2 p + T F n log 3 p)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O((n 3.5 T 3.5 F log 8 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ). The number of loops is at most log r, which is negligible since r ≤ T F , and the complexity of the algorithm is that of Step 4. The theorem is proved. Similar to Corollary 3.10, if F is an MQ then the complexity is lower. Corollary 6.4. There is a quantum algorithm to solve the MQ with noise in time O((n + r log p) 2.5 (T F log p + r log 2 p + n) log 3.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ) with probability 1 − ǫ.
Linear system with noise
When F becomes a linear system, we obtain the linear system with noise (LSWN) [17] . Given a matrix A = (A ij ) ∈ F r×n p and a vector b = (b 1 , . . . , b r ) τ ∈ F r p . The LSWN problem is to find an X such that AX − b = e and the error-vector e ∈ F r p has minimal Hamming weight e H . The algorithm given in Section 6.1 can be used to solve the LSWN and Proposition 6.3 becomes the following form.
Proposition 6.5. There exists a quantum algorithm to solve LSWN with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and in time O((n + r log p) 2.5 (T A + r log 2 p) log 3.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ), where T A ≥ max{r, n} is the number of nonzero entries in A, and κ is the extended condition number of AX.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.3, we need only consider the complexity of solv-
r } , and we have E(AX − b) = F 1 ∪ F 2 . Since F 1 is a linear system, we have
log t i + r log log p, where t i is the sparseness for the i-th row of matrix A. By Lemma 3.3,
and
log t i + r log 2 p). By Theorem 3.6, the complexity to solve
Since T A ≥ r and we can assume T A ≥ n without loss of generality, the complexity is O((n log p + r log 2 p) 2.5 (T A log p + r log 3 p)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O((n + r log p) 2.5 (T A + r log 2 p) log 3.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Short integer solution problem
In this section, we consider the short integer solution problem (SIS), which is a basic problem in the latticed based cryptosystems [1] .
Consider the SIS problem introduced in [1] :
The SIS is to find an X ∈ F n p such that AX = 0 (mod p) and the Euclidean norm of X satisfies 0 < X 2 ≤ b, where b is a given integer.
We first consider the more general SIS for F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ F p [X]: find an X such that F(X) = 0 (mod p) and 0 < X 2 ≤ b. Note that SIS is a special case of the optimization problem (1) , where the objective function is a constant and the problem is to find a feasible solution for the constraints. Precisely, the SIS can be formualted as the following standard form
From Remark 4.3, the representation for F p affects inequality constraints. For the inequality 0 < X 2 2 ≤ b 2 , a better representation for
2 }, instead of {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. In this section, we still use {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} to represent elements in F p , but use the following variable expansion instead of (5):
where X i are defined in (5). Then,
2 when evaluated over C. The following easy result shows that this representation gives the "global" solution to problems involving the Euclidean norm.
Due to (14) and by Lemma 7.2, the constraint 0 ≤ X 2 2 − 1 ≤ b 2 − 1 can be written as the following MQ in Boolean variables
From the above discussion, we have Lemma 7.3. To solve the SIS, we need only to find a solution of
, where P (Q(F)) is obtained similar to P (Q(F)), but using (29) to expand X, V, and U.
Proposition 7.4. There is a quantum algorithm to solve the SIS problem (28) with probability at least 1 − ǫ and complexity O(n 3.5 T 3.5 F log 3.5 d log 4.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ) where T F is the total sparseness of F, d = max{2, log 2 (deg x i (f j )), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , r}, and κ is the condition number of
and with O(nT F log d log p) indeterminates. By Lemma 7.3, we need to solve P (Q(F)) ∪ {δ b } with Theorem 3.6. Comparing to the total sparseness and number of variables of P (Q(F)), #δ b and #G bit are negligible. Then, the complexity of solving the SIS is the same as that of solving P (Q(F)). Then, the theorem follows from Corollary 3.9.
For the original SIS, we have Proposition 7.5. There is a quantum algorithm to find an non-trivial X ∈ Z n for AX = 0 (mod p) with X 2 ≤ b with probability 1 − ǫ and in time O((n log p + r) 2.5 (T A log p + n log 2 p)κ 2 log 1/ǫ), where T A is the number of nonzero elements of A, assuming T A ≥ n.
Proof. By Corollary 3.4, P (Q(AX)) = P (AX) is of total sparseness O(T A log p) and has O(n log p + r i=1 log t i + r log log p) indeterminates, where t i is the sparseness for the i-th line of matrix A.. From the proof of Proposition 7.4, #G bit = O(log n + log p) and #δ b = O(n log 2 p).
log t i + r log log p). Comparing to the total sparseness and number of variables of P (Q(F)), #δ b is negligible. By Theorem 3.6, the complexity to solve P (Q(F)) ∪ {δ b } is O((n log p + r i=1 log t i + r log log p) 2.5 ((n log p + r i=1 log t i + r log log p) + (T A log p + n log 2 p))κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O((n log p + r) 2.5 (T A log p + n log 2 p)κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Smallest integer solution problem
We consider the smallest integer solution problem, which is to find a solution of F = 0 (mod p), which has the minimal Euclidean norm. The problem can be formulated as the following standard form
where u = n(p − 1) 2 . We can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (31). The parameterized objective function and L αβ (F) are
where P (Q(F)) is defined in Lemma 7.3. We have Proposition 7.6. There is a quantum algorithm to solve problem (31) with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and in time O(n 3.5 T 3.5 F log 3.5 d log 4.5 pκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. From the proof of Proposition
Also, log u = O(np 2 ) = O(log n + log p). By Theorem 5.4, the complexity is O(N 2.5
If F is a linear system AX = 0 with T A ≥ n, then we can prove the following result similar to Propositions 7.6 and 7.5. Proposition 7.7. There is a quantum algorithm to find a non-trivial X ∈ Z n for AX = 0 (mod p) with minimal X 2 with probability ≥ 1−ǫ and in time O((n log p+r) 2.5 (T A log p+n log 2 p)κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Quantum algorithm for SVP and CVP
In this section, Algorithm 5.3 is used to solve the SVP and CVP problems [23, 6] .
A lattice generated by B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } ⊂ R m is the set of Z-linear combinations of b i . B is called a basis of the lattice, if b 1 , . . . , b n are linear independent over R. The SVP problem can be described as follows: given a lattice L generated by a basis b 1 , . . . , b n in R m , find a nonzero v ∈ L such that v has the minimal Euclidean norm. The CVP problem can be described as follows: given a vector b 0 ∈ Z m and a lattice L generated by a basis b 1 , . . . , b n in R m , find a v ∈ L such that v − b 0 has the minimal Euclidean norm. In this paper, we assume that b 1 , . . . , b n are in Z m . The SVP problem can be written as the following optimization problem.
where v = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Note that the SVP problem is similar to the SIS problem considered in Proposition 7.7, but the solutions are over the integers instead of finite fields.
be the matrix with columns b 1 , . . . , b n . In order to reduce problem (33) into the standard form (1), we need to find upper bounds for a i , v i , and v 2 . For a matrix or a vector A, let A ∞ to be the maximum absolute value of the elements in A. It is easy to find bounds for v i and v 2 .
In order to bound a i in (33), we need the concept of Hermite normal form (HNF). A matrix H = (h i,j ) ∈ Z m×n of rank n is called an (column) HNF if there exists a strictly increasing map f from [1, n] 
It is known that any lattice generated by a basis b 1 , . . . , b n is also generated by h 1 , . . . , . . . , v m ) τ an element in the lattice generated by h 1 , . . . , h n , and v = c 1 h 1 + · · · + c n h n for c i ∈ Z. Then v f (n) = c n h f (n),n and hence |c n | ≤ ||v|| ∞ .
We also need the following result about HNF.
Theorem 8.3 ([27]
). Let B ∈ Z m×n with rank n and H be the HNF of B. Then, there exists an E ∈ Z m×m such that EB = H, ||H|| ∞ ≤ ( √ n||B|| ∞ ) n and ||E|| ∞ ≤ ( √ n||B|| ∞ ) n . Furthermore, the bit complexity to compute H from B is O(mn θ ||B|| ∞ ), where θ is the matrix multiplication constant.
We now give a bound for a i in (33). 
Proof. Let H = EB be the HNF of B and h i the i-th column of H, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then there exist
. . , n. We prove the claim by proving ||v i || ∞ ≤ e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−i and |c i | ≤ e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−i by induction for i = n, n − 1, . . . , i. By Lemma 8.2, the second inequality comes from the first one: |c i | ≤ ||v i || ∞ ≤ e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−i , since [h 1 , . . . , h i ] is also an HNF. By Lemma 8.2, |c n | ≤ e 1 and the case of i = n is true. Suppose the claim is true for i = n, . . . , j + 1. By Lemma 8.1, we have ||h j+1 || ∞ ≤ e 2 . Since v j = v j+1 − c j+1 h j+1 , we have v j ∞ ≤ ||v j+1 || ∞ + |c j+1 |||h j+1 || ∞ ≤ e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−j−1 + e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−j−1 e 2 = e 1 (e 2 + 1) n−j . The claim is proved. (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = (c 1 , . . . , c n )E, and hence |a i | ≤ n max i |c i | · ||E|| ∞ ≤ ne 1 (e 2 + 1) n e 2 ≤ ne 1 (e 2 + 1) n+1 by Theorem 8.3.
By the above lemma, we can rewrite the SVP as the standard form (1):
where b B is given in Lemma 8.4, and the arguments are v = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Note that, the above problem is already an MQ, so we just need to change the variables to Boolean variables as follows by using Lemma 2.1.
where and A i,j , V i,j are Boolean variables.
Then we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve the problem for u = m||B|| 2 ∞ in the input. For the objective function o, we denote by o the Boolean function obtain from o by replacing the v i by the above equation (34). Let
where C is obtained from v = Proof. The numbers of {A i,j }, {V i,j }, and {C j } in (34) and (35) are n log 2 (2b B ), m log 2 ( √ m||B|| ∞ ) and log 2 (m||B|| 2 ∞ ), respectively. So, N L αβ = n log 2 (2b B ) + m log 2 ( √ m||B|| ∞ ) + log 2 (m||B|| 2 ∞ ) = O(n 3 log h + m log h). The total sparseness of C is O(m(log( √ m B ∞ ) + n log(2b B ))) and the total
The CVP can be solved similar to SVP, where the only difference is that the objective function is o = v − b 0 9 Quantum algorithm to recover the private key for NTRU
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to recover the private key of NTRU from its known public key.
The NTRU cryptosystem depends on three integer parameters (N, p, q) and two sets L f , L g of polynomials in Z[X] with degree N − 1. Note that p and q need not to be prime, but we will assume that gcd(p, q) = 1, and q is always considerably larger than p. Denote Z k to be the ring Z/(k) = {0, 1 . . . , k − 1} for any k ∈ Z >0 . We work in the ring R = Z[X]/(X N − 1). An element F ∈ R will be written as a polynomial or a vector,
Given two positive integers d f and d g , we set
, and the rest 0}.
Let f ∈ L f be invertible both (mod p) and (mod q). The private key for NTRU is f and the public key is h = gf −1 (mod q) for some g ∈ L g . A set of parameters could be (N, p, q) = (107, 3, 64), d f = 15, and d g = 12 [19] .
We need to find f from h. We will reduce this problem to an equation solving problem over the finite rings Z p and
. . , q N −1 ) τ , and h = (h 0 , . . . , h N −1 ) τ . Thus, we have the following equations:
where δ 0i = 1 for i = 0 and δ 0i = 0 for i = 0. Let X = {f i , g i , h i , p i , q i | i = 0, . . . , N − 1}, and
Note that F 1 , F 2 , F 3 are over C, Z q , Z p , respectively. We can modify the method given in Section 3.1 to solve the equation system F 1 = F 2 = F 3 = 0.
We first give a simpler treatment for F 1 . Let Z bit = {F i1 , F i2 , G i1 , G i2 , i = 0, . . . , N − 1} be Boolean variables, f i = F i1 + F i2 − 1 and g i = G i1 + G i2 − 1. Then, the constraints f 3 i = f i and g 3 i = g i are automatically satisfied. When F i1 = 0, F i2 = 1 and F i1 = 1, F i2 = 0, we both have f i = 0.
To avoid this redundance, we add an extra equations F i1 F i2 − F i2 . We have 2d f = N −1
. Then, F 1 is equivalent to
where F bit = {F ij , G ij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1; j = 1, 2}.
We can compute B(F 2 ) ⊂ Z p [X bit ] and B(F 3 ) ⊂ Z p [X bit ] defined in (6) by setting q i = θ q−1 (Q i0 , . . . , Q i⌊log 2 (q−1)⌋ ) and p i = θ p−1 (P i0 , . . . , P i⌊log 2 (p−1)⌋ ), where
{P ij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log 2 (p − 1)⌋}∪ {Q ij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log 2 (q − 1)⌋} Note that F 2 and F 3 are already MQ, we can compute P (F 2 ) and P (F 3 ) as in (9) . Therefore, we can use algorithm QBoolSol to find a Boolean solutionX for
Finally setf i =F i1 +F i2 − 1, and we have a possible private keyf = (f 0 , . . . ,f N −1 ).
Proposition 9.1. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a private key f from the public key h in time O(N 4.5 log 4.5 qκ 2 log 1/ǫ) with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number for F NTRU .
Proof. Only the complexity need to be considered. T F 2 = 2N 2 +N +1, T F 3 = N 2 +1, T F 11 = O(N ). By Lemma 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, T P (F 2 ) = O(N 2 log 2 q), T P (F 3 ) = O(N 2 log 2 p), and then we have T F NTRU = O(N 2 (log 2 q + log 2 p)) = O(N 2 log 2 q) and N F NTRU = O(N log q + N log N + N log log q) = O(N log q) by Lemma 3.3, where we can ignore p considering p ≪ q. By Theorem 3.6, we can obtain a possible private key f in time O(N 4.5 log 4.5 qκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
In the design of NTRU, it is assumed that the size of f and g are small. We can use the methods given in Section 6.1 to find f and g which have the smallest d f + d g . Proposition 9.2. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a private key f from the public key h such that d f + d g is minimal in time O(N 4.5 log 4.5 qκ 2 log 1/ǫ) with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, where κ is the extended condition number for F NTRU .
Proof. Remove For the parameters recommended in [19] , (N, p, q) = (107, 3, 64), (N, p, q) = (167, 3, 128), (N, p, q) = (503, 3, 256), and ǫ = 1%, the complexities in Proposition 9.2 is given in the following Table 1 , κ is the condition number of the corresponding equation systems. From the table, this main part of the complexity is relatively low comparing to its desired security 3 N if κ is small, which implies that the NTRU is safe only if its condition number is large.
Conclusion
In this paper, we give quantum algorithms for two basic computational problems: polynomial system solving over a finite field and the optimization problem where the arguments either take values from a finite field or are bounded integers. The complexities of these quantum algorithms are polynomial in the input size, the maximal degree of the inequality constraints, and κ which is the condition number of certain matrices derived from the problem. So, we achieve exponential speedup for these problems when the condition number is small.
The optimization problem considered in this paper covers many NP-hard problems as special cases. In particular, the proposed algorithms are used to give quantum algorithms for several fundamental computational problems in cryptography, including the polynomial system with noise, the short solution problem, the shortest vector problem, and the NTRU cryptosystem. The complexity for all of these problems is polynomial in the input size and their condition numbers, which means that these problems are difficult to solve by a quantum computer if and only if their condition numbers are large. As a consequence, the NTRU cryptosystem as well as the candidates recently proposed for post-quantum standard of public key cryptosystems [4] are safe against quantum computer attacks only if the condition number of its equation system is large.
The main idea of the algorithm is to convert the equality and inequality constraints of the optimization problem into polynomial equations in Boolean variables and then convert the finding of the minimal value of the objective function into several problems of finding the Boolean solutions for polynomial systems over C, that is B-POSSO. Then the quantum algorithm from [12] is used to find Boolean solutions for these polynomial systems.
As we just mentioned that the optimization problem is reduced into the B-POSSO problem. It is interesting to give a description for all the problems that can be efficiently reduced to B-POSSO. It is also interesting to see whether it is possible to combine the reduction methods introduced in this paper with traditional algorithms for polynomial system solving such as the Gröbenr basis method [3] and the characteristic set method [15] to obtain better traditional algorithms for polynomial system solving and optimization over finite fields. Finally, in order to know the exact complexity of the algorithm proposed in this paper, we need to know the condition number, which is a main future problem for study.
